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For as long as the death penalty remains a viable punishment in the 
United States, safeguarding defendants’ rights from sentencing through 
execution is crucial. As part of that effort, this Article focuses on a portion of 
the capital appellate process that is often overlooked and, in practice, 
effectively divests defendants of significant constitutional claims. 
As illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bucklew v. 
Precythe and Dunn v. Price, defendants face a significant procedural 
predicament in raising warrant- and execution-related claims. On one hand, 
courts have explained that these claims are not ripe, or are premature, when 
raised before a death warrant is issued. On the other hand, as in Bucklew 
and Dunn, when the defendant is under an active death warrant, courts are 
skeptical of the merits of these claims and often determine the defendant 
raised the claim too late, suspecting a game of delay. Since defendants are 
faced with increasingly short and arbitrary warrant periods, this Article 
explains, courts have essentially precluded defendants from properly raising 
and being heard on these critical issues. 
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Addressing this concern, this Article canvasses potential solutions, 
exploring the advantages and disadvantages of each. Ultimately, this Article 
concludes that the best solution is for states to enact and courts to enforce 
uniform warrant procedures. In doing so, this Article proposes language that 
would implement this solution. However, as states’ former attempts to enact 
such procedures show, enforcement by courts is crucial for this solution to be 
effective and properly safeguard defendants’ rights in last-minute, execution-
related appeals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Anyone following the death penalty lately has likely wondered: why 
are executions being delayed later and later? Florida’s most recent execution 
was of Gary Ray Bowles on August 22, 2019.1 Bowles was pronounced dead 
at 10:58 P.M.—almost five hours after the scheduled execution time.2 Just a 
 
1 Eric Levenson, After Late Appeals Are Denied, Florida Executes Serial Killer Who 
Targeted Gay Men Across Southeast, CNN (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2019/08/22/us/gary-bowles-execution-florida/index.html [https://perma.cc/A9H9-K7BZ]. 
2 Id. Similarly, Michael Lambrix (Florida) was pronounced dead at 10:10 P.M. on October 
5, 2017—over four hours after the scheduled execution time. Associated Press, Florida 
Executes Double Murderer Michael Lambrix, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 6, 2017), 
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few months earlier, on June 20, 2019, Marion Wilson (Georgia) became the 
1500th person executed in the United States since capital punishment and 
executions resumed in 1976 after Furman v. Georgia3 and Gregg v. Georgia.4 
Wilson was pronounced dead at 9:52 P.M.—almost three hours after the 
scheduled execution time of 7 P.M.5 As of late, on-time executions seem to 
be the exception, not the rule. 
 Even defendants who receive last-minute stays of execution are 
experiencing delays at time of execution, when it ultimately occurs. 
Christopher Lee Price’s Alabama execution, which was scheduled for April 
11, 2019, was not stayed until after 11:34 P.M. on the night of his execution—
five hours after the scheduled execution time.6                                               
 But these delays are not a result of the state unilaterally delaying 
executions. Rather, the answer lies in a procedural trap courts have created 
 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article177484381.html [https://perma.cc/7 
TDR-WN4S]. Patrick Hannon (Florida) was pronounced dead at 8:50 P.M. on November 7, 
2018—almost three hours after the scheduled execution time. Associated Press, Florida 
Executes Killer Patrick Hannon After Supreme Court Rejects Last-Ditch Appeal, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-patrick-hannon-exec 
ution-20171108-story.html [https://perma.cc/2V4D-LFEX]. 
3 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding the application of the death penalty 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); see also Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law 
Students: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https:// 
www.scotusblog.com/2020/02/scotus-for-law-students-the-supreme-court-and-the-death-penal 
ty/ [https://perma.cc/CSC8-AA69] (tracing the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence). 
4 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing states to reinstitute the death penalty if 
state statutes included individualized considerations to satisfy the concerns expressed in 
Furman); Nicole Chavez & Rebekah Riess, Georgia Inmate is the 1,500th Person Executed in 
the U.S. Since the Death Penalty Was Reinstated, CNN (June 20, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2019/06/20/us/marion-wilson-execution-georgia/index.html [https://perma.cc/N6V8-HSRF].  
5 Id. Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., Wilson Execution Media Advisory (June 13, 2019), 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/wilson-execution-media-advisory 
[https://perma.cc/8L44-KPXD]. Also in Georgia, Scotty Morrow was pronounced dead at 
9:38 P.M. on May 2, 2019—almost three hours after the 7 P.M. scheduled execution time. 
Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., Morrow Execution Final Media Advisory (May 2, 2019), 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/morrow-execution-final-media-advi 
sory [https://perma.cc/MZ4J-HCTJ]; see also Christian Boone, Georgia Executes Scotty 
Morrow for 1994 Murders of 2 Women, ATL. J. CONST. (May 2, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/ 
news/crime--law/georgia-set-execute-convicted-double-murderer-tonight/4r5Ibz4U8zNun6 
yEKqL02M/ [https://perma.cc/9FN3-AJVV]. 
6 Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1313–14 (2019); Alabama, Running Out of Time, Halts 
Execution of Sword and Dagger Killer of Pastor, CBS NEWS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www. 
cbsnews.com/news/alabama-sword-dagger-killer-christopher-lee-price-execution-halted-pas 
tor-bill-lynn/ [https://perma.cc/6634-C5EP]; Brendan O’Brien, Alabama Set to Execute 46-
Year-Old Man Convicted of Killing Minister in 1991, REUTERS (May 30, 2019), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-alabama-execution/alabama-executes-46-year-old-man-convict 
ed-of-killing-minister-in-1991-idUSKCN1T018A [https://perma.cc/VBN4-E45D]. 
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and set for capital defendants that bottlenecks at the time of execution. In 
essence, courts force defendants to raise warrant- and execution-related 
claims challenging the constitutionality of their execution in last-minute 
proceedings. As a result, courts are forced to review these claims in a “fire 
drill approach” under increasingly short warrant periods.7 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court is faced with last-minute petitions on the night of execution, 
the review of which often delays executions for several hours.8  
 Yet courts often deny these claims for being brought too late. The 
result: courts have essentially created a procedural bar that precludes 
defendants from meaningfully raising these substantive and important 
constitutional claims. Courts effectively deprive defendants of the ability to 
meaningfully raise and litigate warrant- and execution-related claims before 
execution. In short, the process defendants and their attorneys must follow 
for litigating warrant- and execution-related claims is fraught with procedural 
bars, rush, and chaos. 
 Despite the general consensus that America will eventually abolish the 
death penalty,9 the trend of states abolishing the death penalty or imposing 
moratoria on executions,10 and public support for capital punishment 
 
7 Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (arguing that, 
these “extremely short warrant period[s] create[] a fire drill approach” to reviewing 
defendant’s final claims for relief); see, e.g., Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/outcomes-of-death-warrants-in-
2020 [https://perma.cc/Q265-XADQ] (charting the outcomes of death warrants in 2020). See 
generally James E. Coleman, Jr., Litigating at the Speed of Light: Postconviction 
Proceedings Under a Death Warrant, 16 LITIG. 14 (1990) (describing the postconviction 
proceedings in the case of Ted Bundy). For more information regarding the term “warrant 
period,” see infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
8 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2763 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“The 
studies bear out my own view, reached after considering thousands of death penalty cases 
and last-minute petitions over the course of more than 20 years.”). As Justice Breyer’s dissent 
in Glossip indicates, this issue has pervaded death penalty litigation for decades. See id. For 
ease of discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court is referenced as the “Supreme Court.” 
9 See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016) (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s 
capital punishment jurisprudence); Austin Sarat et al., The Rhetoric of Abolition: 
Continuity and Change in the Struggle Against America’s Death Penalty, 1900–2010, 107 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2017) (documenting the evolving framing of the 
arguments against capital punishment). 
10 See, e.g., Colorado, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-fed 
eral-info/state-by-state/colorado [https://perma.cc/Y4H6-2QP6] (last visited May 19, 2020) 
(explaining Colorado abolished the death penalty in March 2020); Gretchen Frazee, How 
States Are Slowly Getting Rid of the Death Penalty, PBS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-states-are-slowly-getting-rid-of-the-death-penalty [https://per 
ma.cc/24V4-YY2E]; Sylvia Krohn, Numerous States Consider Repeal of the Death Penalty, 
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decreasing,11 the death penalty will likely be around for a while longer. The 
federal government recently announced its intent to resume executions,12 and the 
Supreme Court has indicated a renewed interest in the topic.13 As long as capital 
punishment remains on the books in the United States, we must ensure defendants’ 
constitutional rights are protected—from sentencing through execution.14 
 The underlying judicial processes that must occur before an inmate 
reaches the execution chamber hold great significance in terms of protecting 
and safeguarding capital defendants’ constitutional rights.15 Specifically, 
the processes that occur after trial—collectively, the capital appellate 
process—are critical in ensuring the constitutionality of capital punishment. 
In fact, the Death Penalty Information Center reported in 2011 that two-
thirds of death sentences are overturned on appellate review.16 An important 
 
AM. BAR ASS’N (May 10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_ 
penalty_representation/project_press/2019/spring/numerous-states-consider-repeal-of-the-
death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/RJ45-PC4X]; see also, e.g., John Gramlich, California Is One 
of 11 States that Have the Death Penalty but Haven’t Used it in More than a Decade, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/03/14/11-states-that-have-
the-death-penalty-havent-used-it-in-more-than-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/47RD-P5L6]. 
11 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2019: YEAR-END REPORT 
(2019), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CS4H-VU93] (reporting that sixty percent of Americans “prefer life without parole 
to the death penalty” as punishment for capital offenses).  
12 Katie Benner, U.S. to Resume Capital Punishment for Federal Inmates on Death Row, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/federal-executions-
death-penalty.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR1d-946v3RMbKUE41lzttdM 
Nmej5YJuwhhtcByXXuqlVpMFKfvJI0-57fo [https://perma.cc/VE4Y-WP7S]; Sadie Gurman 
& Jess Bravin, Federal Government Set to Resume Executions, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-government-set-to-resume-executions-11564066216?mod 
=e2fb&sfns=mo [https://perma.cc/TK3H-6YSX]; see also Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020, 
supra note 7. However, since the federal government made this announcement, litigation 
surrounding the announcement has transpired and remains pending, which has delayed resuming 
executions. See, e.g., Mark Berman & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Won’t Let Justice Dept. 
Immediately Resume Federal Executions After Hiatus, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-wont-let-justice-dept-imm 
ediately-resume-federal-executions-after-hiatus/2019/12/06/7103d8e6-1773-11ea-a659-7d6964 
1c6ff7_story.html [perma.cc/NP6V-47DC]; Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Appeals Court Hands Win to 
Trump Plan to Resume Federal Executions, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-deathpenalty/us-appeals-court-hands-win-to-trump-plan-to-res 
ume-federal-executions-idUSKBN21P2LN [http://perma.cc/X6ZZ-BMMY]. 
13 See infra note 62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bucklew v. Precythe and the 
Court’s seemingly renewed interest in death penalty issues). 
14 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are left with 
a judicial responsibility.”). 
15 E.g., infra note 44 (reviewing scholarship on the processes). 
16 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STRUCK BY LIGHTNING: THE CONTINUING 
ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER ITS RE-INSTATEMENT 
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part of the capital appellate process is the death warrant process, which 
scholarship has generally overlooked.17 
  Focusing on the death warrant process, this Article argues that states 
should implement and enforce uniform warrant procedures that allow courts 
sufficient time to thoroughly review each inmate’s warrant- and execution-
related claims. By way of background, Part II provides an overview of the 
lengthy capital appellate process defendants go through before execution.18 Part 
III then canvasses the difficulty capital defendants face in raising warrant- and 
execution-related claims, as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
in Bucklew and Price. Part IV analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of 
three intuitive and seemingly simple solutions to this issue. After exploring each 
of these potential solutions, Part V contends that the optimal solution is likely 
for state legislatures to enact and courts to enforce uniform warrant and 
execution procedures, whether by statute or rule. Part V also proposes an 
example of legislation that could be used to effectuate this solution.  
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL APPELLATE PROCESS 
 
 After being sentenced to death, capital defendants embark on the long 
capital appellate process. This Part provides a general, chronological 
overview of this process, from the first appeal after sentencing to execution: 
direct appeal, postconviction and federal habeas claims, executive clemency, 
and final, warrant-related claims.19  
 
IN 1976, at 8 (2011), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/StruckByLight 
ning.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP8V-GNEU]; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: 
HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (2017) (“40% of 
death sentences never result in executions because cases are reversed on appeal or 
postconviction for a host of reasons.”). 
17 See infra note 44 (discussing existing scholarship). 
18 This discussion generally assumes that the defendant has not waived the right to any 
appeal. This Article also focuses on the state appellate process. Federal courts also play a 
role—albeit less significant—in this process. See, e.g., Michael A. Millemann, Collateral 
Remedies in Criminal Cases in Maryland: An Assessment, 64 MD. L. REV. 968, 969 (2005) 
(“At the direction of Congress and the United States Supreme Court, the federal judiciary 
now plays an extremely limited role in protecting the federal constitutional rights of state 
prisoners.”); Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Death penalty litigation today is primarily about state 
death penalty laws . . . .”). Those processes are not discussed in this Article. However, as the 
federal government seeks to resume executions after a 16-year moratorium, discussing the 
federal side of this issue will likely be necessary soon. Gurman & Bravin, supra note 12. 
19 See, e.g., Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 656 (Ala. 1980) (“Appellate review of death cases 
is required to make sure that the death penalty will not be wantonly or freakishly imposed.” 
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976))). The exact way in which these processes 
proceed likely varies from state to state. This Article provides a general overview and 
discusses the process generally. 
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 First, the defendant gets a direct appeal—the appeal from the trial 
court’s decision convicting the defendant of a capital offense and 
imposing a sentence of death.20 In the direct appeal, defendants are limited 
to challenging aspects of their trial21—for example, jury selection issues 
or the trial court’s evidentiary determinations.22 In addition to errors 
alleged by the defendant, some courts also review whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction23 and whether the 
sentence of death is proportionate.24 Courts often review these issues—
sufficiency of the evidence and proportionality—even if the defendant 
does not raise a related claim.25 
 
20 See, e.g., Death Penalty Appeals Process, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, 
https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess [https://perma.cc/YPK5 
-4VKP] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) (describing the appellate process following the death 
sentence). This Part provides a general overview. Because state statutes control this process, 
it may differ from state to state. For another overview of this process, see, e.g., Joan M. 
Fisher, Expedited Review of Capital Post-Conviction Claims: Idaho’s Flawed Process, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 85, 88–90 (2000). 
21 See Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20. 
22 See, e.g., Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1991) (direct appeal challenging finding of 
premeditation); Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1986) (direct appeal challenging the 
exclusion of jurors opposed to death penalty and the admission of certain evidence); Russeau v. 
State, 291 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (direct appeal challenging admission of evidence). 
23 In a sufficiency analysis, “the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla. 
2011) (quoting Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234, 1243–44 (Fla. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (defining “sufficient 
proof” as “evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of every element of the offense”). 
24 The purpose of proportionality review, in which courts review “the totality of the 
circumstances to determine if death is warranted in comparison to other cases where the 
sentence of death has been upheld,” is to ensure the crime is among the most aggravated and 
least mitigated and, therefore, deserving of death. Pham, 70 So. 3d at 500 (quoting England 
v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 408 (Fla. 2006)); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984) 
(explaining that proportionality review is not constitutionally required under Supreme Court 
case law). Not all states conduct proportionality review. See, e.g., Brooks Emanuel, North 
Carolina’s Failure to Perform Comparative Proportionality Review: Violating the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments by Allowing the Arbitrary and Discriminatory Application of 
the Death Penalty, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 419, 422–31 (2015) (“North 
Carolina’s imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.”). For more on proportionality, see generally William W. 
Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687 (2012); William W. Berry III, 
Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69 (2011); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, 
Proportionality Review and the Death Penalty, 29 JUSTICE SYS. J. 257 (2008).  
25 See, e.g., Pham, 70 So. 3d at 501.  
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 When the state’s highest court denies the direct appeal, the defendant 
usually files a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.26 The Supreme 
Court rarely grants petitions for writs of certiorari, much less in capital cases.27 
When the Supreme Court denies the petition for writ of certiorari arising from 
the direct appeal, that is the end of the litigation resulting from the original trial.28  
 Once the defendant’s sentence of death is final, the defendant may 
raise postconviction (or “collateral”) claims as well as a state habeas corpus 
petition.29 Postconviction review is available in every state.30 In this phase, 
defendants raise claims “surrounding the conviction and sentence that are 
outside of the record”31—for example, ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
or newly discovered evidence.32 If the trial court denies the defendant’s 
postconviction motion, the defendant may appeal to the state’s appellate 
court.33 Likewise, if the trial court grants relief, the state may appeal. When 
the appellate court denies the postconviction appeal, defendants, again, 
usually file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
 Outside of the first, guaranteed postconviction claim, defendants may 
also and often do file successive postconviction appeals—again depending 
on each state’s statutes and rules. The literature and jurists widely recognize 
 
26 E.g., Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20; Supreme Court Procedure, 
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/supreme-court 
-procedure/ [https://perma.cc/E67E-GTWX] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). For more on 
certiorari generally, see generally, e.g., Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 
33 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 611 (1984). 
27 E.g., The Supreme Court—The Statistics, 133 HARV. L. REV. 412, 427 tbl.III (2019); The 
Supreme Court—The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410, 413 tbl.III (2017); see also 
Success Rate of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. PRESS, 
https://supremecourtpress.com/chance_of_success.html [https://perma.cc/NT2X-CPHY] (last 
visited May 27, 2019) (listing the success rate of writs of certiorari by year); Wermiel, supra 
note 3 (“It is extremely rare for the Supreme Court to agree to hear a direct appeal, however 
. . . . That direct appeal may go all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court but will rarely be 
granted.”); Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 
[https://perma.cc/9QTQ-PESC] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020) (“[T]he Court accepts 100-150 of 
the more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year.”); Supreme Court Procedure, 
supra note 26 (“Of the 7,000 to 8,000 cert petitions filed each term, the court grants certiorari 
and hears oral argument in only about 80.”). 
28 Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20. 
29 E.g., Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in 
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 4 (A. Redlich et 
al., eds., 2014); Wermiel, supra note 3. 
30 KING, supra note 29, at 4; see Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1988) (initial postconviction 
appeal challenging effectiveness of trial counsel). 
33 See Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 20. 
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the length of time defendants spend litigating postconviction claims, or the 
delay postconviction causes in the capital process.34 In fact, some, including 
the late Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, have argued that this delay 
amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment.35 
 For example, Florida defendant Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted 
in 1984 of a murder that occurred in 1983.36 Before his execution in 2017, 
Lambrix had “filed numerous successive petitions for postconviction relief and 
successive habeas petitions” in state court, as well as “numerous . . . pleadings 
in federal court.”37 Even after the Supreme Court of Florida “determin[ed] in 
2013 that Lambrix had ‘exhausted all permissible legal remedies in his case,’ 
Lambrix . . . continued to raise repetitive state and federal claims” all the way 
through to his execution.38 
 
34 See, e.g., Individual Justices and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/united-states-supreme-court/individual-
justices [https://perma.cc/FLU7-ZXP9] (last visited Apr. 23, 2020) (documenting the 
Justice’s public statements regarding the death penalty, including statements recognizing the 
length of time defendants spend on death row while their cases are pending). See generally, 
e.g., Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due 
Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 55 (1990) (discussing due 
process defects within the capital punishment system).  
35 E.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the death penalty may violate the Eight Amendment because of “lack of reliability, the 
arbitrary application of a serious and irreversible punishment, individual suffering caused by 
long delays, and lack of penological purpose”); see also Christopher E. Smith, Justice John 
Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 205, 246 (2010) (tracing 
the evolution of Justice Stevens’s death penalty jurisprudence, including his eventual belief 
that a “penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and 
unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment” (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 
78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration in original))); David Cole, Justice Breyer v. the 
Death Penalty, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/justice-breyer-against-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/RXQ8-GLZZ] (highlighting 
Justice Breyer’s jurisprudence discussing whether the death penalty violates the Eight 
Amendment); Justice John Paul Stevens’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/justice-john-paul-stevenss-death-penalty- 
jurisprudence [https://perma.cc/DX29-QMNW] (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (listing excerpts 
from Justice Stevens’ opinions regarding the death penalty). But see, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Breyer’s point about the time defendant spend 
on death row is “nonsense”). 
36 See, e.g., Emily Mavrakis, Michael Lambrix Executed After 33 Years on Florida’s Death 
Row, WUFT (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.wuft.org/news/2017/10/06/michael-lambrix- 
executed-after-33-years-on-floridas-death-row/ [https://perma.cc/Z7XC-JGQ4].  
37 Lambrix v. State, 217 So. 3d 977, 981–82 (Fla. 2017); accord Lambrix v. Jones, 227 So. 
3d 550, 552 (Fla. 2017) (“Lambrix’s ‘death case . . . has been in the judicial system for a 
substantial period of time.’” (quoting Lambrix v. State, 39 So. 3d 260, 262 (Fla. 2010))). 
38 Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at 552 (quoting Lambrix v. State, 124 So. 3d 890, 900 (Fla. 2013)). 
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 Outside of the appellate process, defendants may also petition for 
executive clemency.39 In this process, the governor (or a board of advisors, 
or a combination of the two) has full discretion to commute a defendant’s 
sentence—implementing, instead, a sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole.40 Thus, the clemency process is essentially without standards or rules. 
Since the death penalty was reinstituted in 1976, the frequency of executive 
clemency in capital cases has declined.41  
 Once a defendant exhausts his or her guaranteed appeals, a death 
warrant may be issued scheduling the defendant’s execution.42 In fact, some 
states require the issuance of a death warrant once certain appeals have been 
denied.43 While scholars often discuss capital punishment—more 
specifically, capital sentencing processes and the constitutional or moral 
 
39 See Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-re 
search/clemency [https://perma.cc/3BZ8-QRNY] (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (describing the 
clemency process). As with the other processes discussed in this Article, each state has its 
own laws regarding executive clemency. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive 
Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 256 (1990). Generally, 
“[c]lemency decisions . . . are standardless in procedure, discretionary in exercise, and 
unreviewable in result.” Id. at 257; accord Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and 
the Death Penalty, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 94, 95 (1971) (“The power to pardon is absolute.”).  
40 See Bedau, supra note 39 (highlighting that clemency can result in commutation of a death 
sentence “to a less severe punishment,” like a “lengthy prison term[]”); Michael L. Radelet 
& Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 289, 289–290 (1993) (noting that the authority to pardon, grant reprieve, or commute 
a sentence varies by state); Clemency, supra note 39 (discussing courts’ reluctance to impose 
upon executive discretion to grant clemency); see also, e.g., Caroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 
887–88 (Fla. 2013) (“[I]t is not this Court’s prerogative to second-guess the executive branch 
on matters of clemency in capital cases”). 
41 Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 40, at 290 (citing Bedau, supra note 39, at 257); see 
Rockefeller, supra note 39, at 97 (“[E]xecutive clemency in the United States has been 
reserved for the rare exception.”). See generally Clemency, supra note 39 (showing the low 
number of clemencies granted by states since 1976). 
42 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 922.052  (2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.141 (West 
2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.160 (2020); see also Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Typically, 
an inmate who is still pursuing a direct appeal or who has a first habeas petition pending in 
federal court is entitled to a stay, which is a court order freezing the status quo to prevent 
execution while the appeals are pending.”). Like the appellate process, the warrant process 
differs from state to state. 
43 See, e.g., Susanna Bagdasarova, Florida Accelerates Death Penalty Process with “Timely 
Justice Act,” AM. B. ASS’N (June 1, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/commit 
tees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2013/summer/florida-accelerates-death-pen 
alty-process-with-timely-justice-ac/ [https://perma.cc/J8FS-PQMW] (discussing Florida’s 
Timely Justice Act of 2013). See generally OFFICE OF VICTIM’S SERVS., CAL. ATT’Y GEN.’S 
OFFICE., A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 16, 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF4S 
-4P68] (discussing the process of capital cases in California). 
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viability of the death penalty altogether—the death warrant process has not 
been addressed nearly as often or as thoroughly.44 
 The time between the warrant being issued and the scheduled 
execution is referred to as “the warrant period.”45 Generally, once a warrant 
is issued, the defendant is moved from his or her cell on death row to another 
area—or, in some instances, another facility—called “death watch.”46 There, 
the defendant prepares for execution. 
 
44 For scholarship on capital sentencing process at trial, see generally, e.g., Carissa Byrne 
Hessick & William W. Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 448 (2019) (arguing that Sixth Amendment sentencing after Hurst “invalidates several 
state capital sentencing systems and several noncapital systems”); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory 
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998) (discussing whether 
the addition of aggravating and mitigating factors has actually eliminated arbitrariness in 
capital sentencing after Furman); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another 
Decade of Legislative Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 
1 (2006) (discussing how legislatures have recently expanded the death penalty by adding 
aggravating factors to capital sentencing schemes). Specifically, for scholarship regarding 
capital juries, see generally, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Moral Accuracy & “Wobble” in Capital 
Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J. 56 (2005) (arguing that any “any system where a jury is asked to 
make the moral judgment of whether someone should die” will contain inconsistency); Scott 
E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, 
and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998) (analyzing the “role of remorse 
and its interaction with trial strategy”); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical 
Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997) 
(examining how, in capital trials, jurors “react differently to expert and non-expert testimony 
and determine how they perceive so-called ‘abuse excuse’ defenses”). 
 For scholarship on capital postconviction processes, see generally, e.g., Fisher, 
supra note 20 (focusing “on the operation of expedited capital postconviction review 
procedure in Idaho”); Levit, supra note 34 (arguing for procedural due process challenges to 
capital cases).   
 For scholarship on the viability of the death penalty altogether, see generally, e.g., 
William W. Berry III, Unusual State Capital Punishments, 72 FLA. L. REV. 315 (2020). 
45 E.g., Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 n.23 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting); 
Coronavirus Pandemic Halts Executions, Perhaps for the Foreseeable Future, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/coronavirus-pan 
demic-halts-executions-perhaps-for-the-foreseeable-future [https://perma.cc/83NN-PBKN]. 
46 See, e.g., Sydney P. Freedberg, ‘Yes, I’m Angry. . . . Yes, I’m Bitter. I’m Frustrated,’ ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (July 4, 1999), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1914 [https://perm 
a.cc/69VQ-X8AR] (detailing the days preceding one individual’s near execution); Adam 
Tamburin, Death Row Inmate Billy Ray Irick Moved to Death Watch Ahead of Thursday 
Execution Date, TENNESSEAN (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/ 
crime/2018/08/07/tennessee-death-row-billy-ray-irick-moved-death-watch-before-execution-
date/923464002/ [https://perma.cc/4AKF-VULW] (“Death watch is the three-day period 
before an execution when strict guidelines are implemented to maintain the security and control 
of the offender and to maintain safe and orderly operations of the prison . . . .”); see also Death 
Row, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html [https://perma.cc/ 274L-
SHA3] (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (providing an overview of death row in Florida prisons).  
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 After a warrant issues, most defendants file a final claim raising 
warrant- or execution-related claims, which ultimately leads to a final appeal. 
While some defendants may raise these claims before a death warrant is 
issued,47 courts generally consider these claims premature and, as explained 
below, deny the claims when brought before a warrant. Claims defendants 
raise after a warrant is issued (referenced collectively herein as “warrant- or 
execution-related claims”) include—but are not limited to—arguments that 
(a) the warrant process is arbitrary and, therefore, violates the Eighth 
Amendment; (b) the execution will violate the Eighth Amendment due to the 
time the defendant has spent on death row; (c) the method of execution 
violates the Eighth Amendment because it causes a substantial risk of pain 
and, therefore, amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; and (d) the 
defendant is otherwise ineligible for execution under the Eighth 
Amendment—due to intellectual disability or for some other reason.48 
 Oftentimes, courts are rushed to review these warrant- or execution-
related claims because defendants face short warrant periods,49 which force 
them to raise, litigate, obtain a ruling on, and exhaust appeals on these claims 
within a matter of weeks—sometimes days.50 As one author explained,  
 
47 See infra Part III (discussing procedural setbacks defendants may face in their death 
penalty claims, including issues with ripeness). 
48 See, e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 941 (Fla. 2019) (court denying defendant’s many 
constitutional claims, including that the death penalty violated his rights due to the length of 
time he had spent on death row, his mental illness, and the lethal injection method); Asay v. 
State, 224 So. 3d 695, 702–03 (Fla. 2017) (defendant challenging the lethal injection method 
and the death penalty, generally, by alleging that the court’s prior actions were arbitrary and 
violated his due process rights); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 550, 552 (Fla. 2017) (court 
denying defendant’s evidentiary and procedural claims for relief). In addition, defendants 
may raise claims of innocence or other guilt-related claims.  
49 For example, in Florida, recent executions followed warrant periods of around thirty days. 
See Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (“Since 
executions resumed in Florida [in 2017], the judicial system—the circuit courts, this Court, 
and the United States Supreme Court—has been faced with increasingly short warrant 
periods, the shortest being the one in this case—a mere 27 days.”). Recent warrant periods 
in Alabama have been just as short. See, e.g., Ivana Hrynkiw, Execution Date Set for Man 
Convicted in 1997 Pelham Quadruple Slaying, AL.COM, https://www.al.com/news/bir 
mingham/2019/04/execution-date-set-for-man-convicted-in-1997-pelham-quadruple-slaying. 
html [https://perma.cc/2E37-DYBA] (last updated May 14, 2019) (detailing an Alabama 
death row inmate’s short warrant period of only a few weeks); see also Melanie Kalmanson, 
Steps Toward Abolishing Capital Punishment: Incrementalism in the American Death 
Penalty, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 587, 630-34 (2020) (discussing the effect of delay in 
the warrant and execution process). 
50See, e.g., Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1315 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is 
possible that Price was given no more than 72 hours to decide how he wanted to die, 
notwithstanding the 30-day period prescribed by state law.”); Levit, supra note 34, at 83 
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Collapsing the time for adjudication of capital habeas cases 
has a powerful substantive impact. Death row inmates, who 
have no right to counsel, who are generally uneducated, and 
who must psychologically prepare to die, are forced to 
comprehend several supremely complex areas of law, all 
within an accelerated time frame.51  
As this Article explains, this concern is exacerbated with respect to warrant- 
and execution-related claims. 
 As with the other appeals discussed above, after the state court denies 
warrant- and execution-related claims, defendants generally file petitions for 
writs of certiorari and/or applications for a stay of execution with the 
Supreme Court.52 The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari or stay of 
execution at this point is generally the final step before the defendant 
proceeds to execution. The rush of short warrant periods often causes the 
Supreme Court to review last-minute petitions for writ of certiorari.53 The 
last-minuteness often causes the Supreme Court to delay execution while it 
reviews the last-minute requests for relief.54  
 Despite the extent of the capital appellate process, a gaping hole exists 
somewhere between death row and death watch. In that hole is the time at 
which defendants may properly raise warrant- and execution-related claims 
and have a fair opportunity to fully litigate those claims. 
 
II. GAPING HOLE IN THE CAPITAL APPELLATE PROCESS, AS ILLUSTRATED 
BY U.S. SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISIONS 
 
 The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia in 
1972 and then Gregg v. Georgia in 1976 instituted contemporary capital 
punishment.55 Since then, most of the Supreme Court’s decisions instituting 
 
(“[C]apital habeas litigants may be required, on extremely short notice, to argue . . . that a 
pending execution should be stayed and to fully litigate the range of substantive legal issues 
and habeas procedures on the merits.”); Executions Scheduled for 2020, supra note 7. 
51 Levit, supra note 34, at 56. 
52 For more explanation on the process the Supreme Court uses in reviewing these requests, 
see, e.g., Wermiel, supra note 3. 
53 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The studies 
[highlighting the arbitrary application of the death penalty] bear out my own view, reached 
after considering thousands of death penalty cases and last-minute petitions over the course 
of more than 20 years.”); Wermiel, supra note 3 (“Today, a stay application may still come 
in at night and close to the time of execution.”). 
54 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Kalmanson, supra note 49, at 630–34 
(discussing delays in the warrant and execution process). 
55 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see 
Wermiel, supra note 3 (explaining the background information). 
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changes to capital punishment—other than decisions holding certain classes 
of defendants ineligible for execution under the Eighth Amendment56—have 
addressed the judicial processes that must occur between the crime and 
execution.57 The Supreme Court has issued prophylactic decisions clarifying 
how constitutional principles apply to certain aspects of the capital 
punishment process58 but has avoided squarely confronting the 
constitutionality of capital punishment,59 despite some Justices urging the 
Court to do so.60  
 Justice Kennedy’s 2018 retirement undoubtedly ushered in a new era 
for the Court—in more contexts than just capital punishment.61 Although the 
 
56 See generally, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that juvenile 
defendants are not eligible for capital punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(holding that intellectually disabled defendants are not eligible for capital punishment); Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that insane defendants are not eligible for 
capital punishment). For more on how the pool of eligibility has been narrowed and how this 
may continue in the future, see generally Kalmanson, supra note 49. 
57 E.g., McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 709 (2020) (holding that “state appellate courts 
may . . . [independently] reweigh[] aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and may do 
so in collateral proceedings as appropriate and provided under state law”); see also, e.g., 
Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 MO. L. REV. 73, 73 (2007) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has laid down dozens of procedural rules for the death penalty 
over the last thirty years.”); id. at 76 (“[T]oday’s death-penalty trials are marked by 
considerably more rules and procedural hurdles than three decades ago.”(emphasis 
removed)); Renee Knake, Abolishing Death, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2018) 
(explaining the procedure-based issues the Court generally hears in death penalty cases). See 
generally STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 9 (addressing the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
regulation of the death penalty). 
58 See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (“We simply enforce and 
reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”). 
59 See, e.g., Knake, supra note 57, at 10 (“[A] majority of the Supreme Court appears unlikely 
to conclude that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.”); 
James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 119 (2007) (discussing the need for the Supreme Court 
to further regulate capital punishment); see also Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating 
Factors, supra note 44, at 350–51 (explaining how, before Furman, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of capital punishment). See generally James E. Coleman, One Way or 
Another the Death Penalty Will Be Abolished, but Only After the Public No Longer Has 
Confidence in Its Use, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 15–16 (2018) (arguing that a 
prerequisite for any successful abolitionist movement must be the erosion of public 
confidence in the death penalty). 
60 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Ginsburg, J., joining). 
61 See, e.g., Brendan Beery, Rational Basis Loses its Bite: Justice Kennedy’s Retirement 
Removes the Most Lethal Quill from LGBT Advocates’ Equal Protection Quiver, 69 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 69, 71 (2019) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s influence on LGBT rights); Zachary S. 
Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy 
Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1314 (2019) (discussing the fate of substantive due 
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full effect of Justice Kennedy’s departure remains unclear, the “new” Court 
has already proven more outspoken on capital punishment than the “old” 
Court. The new Court seems to have a renewed interest in the death penalty, 
as demonstrated most clearly by the Court’s recent decision in Bucklew v. 
Precythe.62 The Court’s decision in Bucklew will undoubtedly spur discussion 
about the principles surrounding capital sentencing and what the future may 
hold for capital punishment under the new Court. Contributing to that 
discussion, this Article explains how Bucklew and another recent Supreme 
Court decision, Dunn v. Price,63 illustrate a widespread and longstanding 
problem defendants face in raising warrant- and execution-related claims.64 
 Oftentimes, courts deny capital defendants’ warrant- and 
execution-related claims as unripe when raised before the defendant is 
under an active death warrant.65 In doing so, courts reason that these 
 
process under the post-Kennedy Court); Impact of Justice Kennedy’s Retirement Examined, 
HARV. GAZETTE (June 28, 2018), https://news.harvard.edu/ gazette/story/2018/06/the-impact-
of-justice-kennedys-retirement-is-examined/ [https://perma.cc/ QVG2-ED6Z] (explaining 
the impact of Justice Kennedy’s retirement on the future of the Court); Stewart M. Patrick, 
The Global Implications of Justice Kennedy’s Retirement, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 
28, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/global-implications-justice-kennedys-retirement 
[https://perma.cc/G4P5-86CS] (discussing the effect Kennedy’s retirement will likely have on 
international law). Some argue that Trump’s presidency coinciding with Kennedy’s retirement 
further contributes to this change. See generally J. Richard Broughton, The Federal Death 
Penalty, Trumpism, and Civil Rights Enforcement, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1611 (2018) (observing 
“the underappreciated place of the federal death penalty in American law and politics”). 
62 Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019); see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, A 
Supreme Court Do-Over, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
04/11/opinion/supreme-court-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/X874-YRP8] (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s “glaringly disparate treatment of two death-row inmates”); Lawrence 
Hurley, Death Penalty Tensions Flare Again on Divided U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS 
(May 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-deathpenalty/death-penalty-
tensions-flare-again-on-divided-u-s-supreme-court-idUSKCN1SJ1RI [https://perma.cc/AP 
L6-SJFG] (noting “internal divisions” between Supreme Court Justices on the issue of capital 
punishment); Adam Liptak, Rancor and Raw Emotion Surface in Supreme Court Death 
Penalty Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/PS3Z -XY4L] (noting the close 
5–4 decision in a capital punishment case).  
63 Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312 (2019). 
64 Some scholars have discussed this issue in the past. See generally Fisher, supra note 20 
(discussing procedural delays between conviction and execution); Levit, supra note 34 
(discussing due process concerns in capital cases). 
65 See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 918 (Fla. 2013) (“We have repeatedly held that 
this claim may not be asserted until a death warrant has been issued.” (citing Johnson v. 
State, 104 So. 3d 1010, 1029 (Fla. 2012))); Butler v. State, 100 So. 3d 638, 672 (Fla. 2012) 
(“As this Court has explained, ‘a claim of incompetency to be executed cannot be asserted 
until a death warrant has been issued.’ ” (citing Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1115–16 
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claims are not ripe until the inmate has an active death warrant.66 But, 
when the inmate is under an active death warrant and raises these claims, 
courts oftentimes deny the claims for being raised too late67—as Bucklew 
and Price illustrate. In fact, as Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in 
Bucklew illustrates, some courts accuse defendants of raising these claims 
merely as an attempt to delay execution.68 Indeed, the media perpetuates 
this narrative.69  
 This Part uses the Court’s decisions in Bucklew and Price to illustrate 
how the system’s gaping procedural hole effectively deprives defendants of an 
opportunity to meaningfully raise warrant- and execution-related claims. While 
illustrative of this problem, Bucklew and Price’s cases are not anomalies. Rather, 
this issue pervades the capital appellate process across the country, causing last-
minute delays in the hours before execution. The idea that defendants engage in 
last-minute gamesmanship to delay executions is prevalent in decades of 
precedent from both the Supreme Court and state courts.70 In fact, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly allowed courts to “consider the last-minute nature of an 
application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief.”71  
 
 
(Fla. 2008))); Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 521–22 (Fla. 2008) (holding that defendant’s 
claim that he was insane and, therefore, ineligible for execution was not ripe for review 
because “a death warrant ha[d] not yet been signed”); Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 36 
(Fla. 2004) (“However, this claim cannot be raised until an execution is imminent.”); Jones 
v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (“[C]laim is not ripe for review because Jones has not 
yet been found incompetent and a death warrant has not yet been signed.”); State v. 
Washington, 330 P.3d 596, 626 (Or. 2014) (“We agree with the state that the specific method 
of defendant’s execution—as opposed to the death sentence itself—is not ripe for 
consideration by this court, nor will it be until all direct and collateral review proceedings 
have concluded and a death warrant has issued.”). Contra, e.g., Gregory v. Pa. State Police, 
160 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (finding that “[w]ith regard to ripeness, the issues 
here are fully developed” despite the defendant having no active death warrant because “the 
harm is not speculative” and eventually “will be imposed by operation of law”). 
66 E.g., supra note 65.  
67 See Adam Liptak, Over 3 A.M. Dissent, Supreme Court Says Alabama Execution May 
Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/us/politics/ 
supreme-court-alabama-execution-.html [https://perma.cc/K3XU-3BK8] (describing the 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion permitting the execution of Christopher L. Price); see 
also, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim 
because it was raised at the last minute). 
68 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019) (implying that defendant used 
claim as a tactic to forestall execution). 
69 See, e.g., Gurman & Bravin, supra note 12 (providing an example of the media’s 
participation in this “delay” narrative). 
70 See, e.g., Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649 (quoting Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 503 
U.S. 653, 654 (1992)) (noting that defendants employ legal tactics to delay capital punishment). 
71 Id. (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654). 
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A. Supreme Court’s Decision in Bucklew v. Precythe 
  
In 2014, Russell Bucklew raised an as-applied Eighth Amendment 
challenge to the State of Missouri’s lethal injection protocol, alleging it would 
cause him substantial pain due to an “unusual medical condition” that would 
result in significant complications during execution.72 After extensive 
litigation about appropriate alternatives to lethal injection for Bucklew’s 
execution, in 2018, the Supreme Court—before Justice Kennedy’s 
retirement—granted a second stay of execution on the day Bucklew was 
scheduled to be executed.73  
 Then, on April 1, 2019, after Justice Kennedy’s retirement, the new 
Court issued its decision in Bucklew. Despite the long history of litigation on 
Bucklew’s claim, the majority opinion continuously accused Bucklew of 
raising the claim as a delay tactic. In the first paragraph of the majority 
opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote: “Mr. Bucklew raised this claim for the first 
time less than two weeks before his scheduled execution.”74 Then, 
concluding Bucklew was not entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment, 
Justice Gorsuch again questioned whether Bucklew’s motive for filing the 
claim was merely gamesmanship to delay execution.75 Justice Gorsuch 
suggested Bucklew may have been more interested in delaying his 
execution than avoiding unnecessary pain due to his inability to identify an 
available alternative to the lethal injection protocol he challenged.76 At the 
end of the majority opinion, Gorsuch even stated that Bucklew was 
successful in “secur[ing] delay through lawsuit after lawsuit,”77 and opined 
that “[t]he people of Missouri, the surviving victims of Mr. Bucklew’s 
crimes, and others like them deserve better.”78 The word “delay” appears in 
the Court’s majority opinion six times.79 
Consistent with how state courts often treat last-minute warrant- 
and execution-related claims, the majority seemed to use the delay theory 
as a reason for denying Bucklew’s claim. For example, the majority 
commented that it is not for the courts to “reward those who interpose 
delay with a decree ending capital punishment by judicial fiat.”80 Rather, 
“[t]he proper role of courts is to ensure that method-of-execution 
 
72 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1118. 
73 Id. at 1122. 
74 Id. at 1118. 
75 Id. at 1128–29. 
76 Id. at 1129. 
77 Id. at 1133–34 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 1134. 
79 Id. at 1128–34. 
80 Id. 
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challenges to lawfully issued sentences are resolved fairly and 
expeditiously. Courts should police carefully against attempts to use such 
challenges as tools to interpose unjustified delay.”81 
In their separate dissenting opinions, both Justice Breyer—joined 
by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan82—and Justice Sotomayor responded to 
the majority’s theme of delay. While acknowledging the state’s and 
victims’ interests in expediting executions, Justice Breyer explained that 
delays pervade the capital process, from the time defendants spend waiting 
on death row for execution—a topic on which Justice Breyer has written 
extensively83—to the execution process itself.84 Related to the issue 
discussed here, Justice Breyer explained that, contrary to the majority’s 
suggestion, these delays actually affect defendants’ substantive rights, as 
opposed to merely causing an inconvenience to the courts.85 
Rather, Justice Breyer noted, the majority has created 
“unwarranted obstacles in the path of prisoners” seeking relief from 
unconstitutional executions.86 Justice Breyer also distinguished between 
the delay caused by the appellate process, over which defendants have no 
control, and the delay caused by what the majority characterizes as 
defendants raising frivolous claims just before execution, commenting 
that the “majority’s new rules are not even likely to improve the problems 
of delay at which they are directed.”87 Similarly, Justice Sotomayor 
clarified that the issue of delay was not before the Court and emphasized 
that delay should not be a reason to foreclose otherwise meritorious 
constitutional claims.88 Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority’s 
discussion on delay should not be read to endorse a standard under which 
courts “treat[] late-arising claims as presumptively suspect.”89 
 As Justices Breyer and Sotomayor explain, the majority’s decision 
in Bucklew unnecessarily condoned lower courts denying defendants’ 
warrant- and execution-related claims for being brought too close to 
execution. Yet, the majority failed to address the fact that oftentimes 
defendants have no choice but to raise these claims close to execution due 
 
81 Id. 
82 Justice Sotomayor also joined the dissent, but not as to the discussion on delay. Id. at 1146 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
83 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the cruelty of excessive delay in death penalty cases); id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (responding to Justice Breyer’s discussion on delay). 
84 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1144–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 1445. 
88 Id. at 1146 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 1147. 
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to short warrant periods and precedent directing that these claims are ripe 
only after a warrant has been issued.90 
 
B. Eleven Days After Bucklew: Supreme Court Issues 3 A.M. Decision in 
Dunn v. Price 
  
Eleven days after the Court decided Bucklew, Alabama was 
scheduled to execute Christopher Lee Price at 6:00 P.M.91 Price had 
requested that he be executed using nitrogen hypoxia instead of lethal 
injection so he would not endure “severe pain and needless suffering” 
during his execution.92 When the State denied his request, Price brought an 
Eighth Amendment claim similar to Bucklew’s.93  
 Determining Price was “likely to prevail on the issue of whether 
execution by nitrogen . . . would provide a significant reduction in the 
substantial risk of severe pain Price would incur if he were executed by 
lethal injection,” the U.S. District Court granted a stay of execution.94 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit “refused to vacate the 
District Court’s stay.”95  
 Around 9:00 P.M. the night of Price’s scheduled execution, the State 
of Alabama filed an application to the Supreme Court to lift the stay of 
execution, which was “referred to the Conference.”96 When the application 
was still pending at 11:34 P.M., the state called off the execution because 
the death warrant expired at midnight and there was no longer enough time 
before the warrant expired to complete the execution.97 It would be a few 
more hours before the Supreme Court issued its decision.98  
 Finally, around 3:00 A.M. the morning after Christopher Price’s 
execution was scheduled, the Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph 
 
90 See supra note 65 (illustrating circumstances in which defendants were unable to raise 
Eighth Amendment claims until shortly prior to their execution dates). 
91 Price v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019); Price v. Dunn, 
385 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2019).  
92 Dunn v. Price, 139 S. Ct. 1312, 1313 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
93 Price v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d at 1321. 
94 Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1313–14 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Price v. Dunn, 385 F. Supp. 
3d at 1233). 
95 Id. at 1314. 
96 Id. 
97 Brendan O’Brien & Alex Dobuzinskis, U.S. Supreme Court Will Allow Execution, 
Alabama Still Delayed as Death Warrant Expired at Midnight, REUTERS (April 11, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alabama-execution/u-s-supreme-court-will-allow-execu 
tion-alabama-still-delayed-as-death-warrant-expired-at-midnight-idUSKCN1RN14E [https:// 
perma.cc/9D4E-5F2Q]; Alabama, Running Out of Time, Halts Execution of Sword and 
Dagger Killer of Pastor, supra note 6. 
98 O’Brien & Dobuzinskis, supra note 97. 
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decision granting the State of Alabama’s application to vacate the stay of 
execution.99 Again, the majority suggested that Price’s claim was merely a 
delay tactic.100 
 Once more, Justice Breyer dissented—joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan. He explained that the Court had denied his 
“request[] that the Court take no action” until the next morning, “when the 
matter could be discussed at Conference.”101 Although he “recognized that 
[his] request would delay resolution of the application and that the State 
would have to obtain a new execution warrant, thus delaying the execution 
by 30 days,” Justice Breyer felt the “delay was warranted.”102 
 Explaining the irony in the Court’s suggestion that Price’s claim 
only served to delay execution, Justice Breyer wrote: “The Court suggests 
that the reason is delay. But that suggestion is untenable in light of the 
District Court’s express finding that Price has been ‘proceeding as quickly 
as possible on this issue since before the execution date was set.’”103 
 As a result of the Court’s decision, Price’s execution was 
rescheduled for May 30, 2019.104 Again, Price filed an application for stay 
of execution to the Supreme Court. Over an hour after the rescheduled 
execution, in another 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court denied Price’s 
application for stay.105 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion (joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) revealed that the district court 
had scheduled a trial on Price’s claims for June 10.106  
 As the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bucklew and Price illustrate, 
defendants are caught between the proverbial rock and hard place when it 
comes to raising warrant- and execution-related claims. The rock: Courts 
deny defendants’ warrant- and execution-related claims as premature when 
raised before the defendant is under an active warrant. The hard place: Once 
a warrant is issued—generally with an extremely short warrant period—
 
99 Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1312; Liptak, supra note 67. 
100 Price, 139 S. Ct. at 1312. 
101 Id. at 1314 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (citation omitted). 
104 Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2019, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/stories/outcomes-of-death-warrants-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/73ZB-FXKY] (last updated 
Dec. 11, 2019). 
105 Alabama Executes Man Convicted of Killing Pastor with Sword and Knife Just Before 
Christmas, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/christopher-lee-
price-execution-alabama-executes-man-for-killing-pastor-with-sword-and-knife-just-before 
-christmas/ [https://perma.cc/GR86-A2B8]. 
106 Id.  
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courts deny warrant- and execution-related claims as being brought too late, 
or merely as a tactic to delay execution.107  
 
III. SEEMINGLY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS 
  
Two seemingly simple solutions to this procedural difficulty arise: 
(A) allow defendants to raise execution-related claims sooner, or (B) disallow 
courts from using delay as a reason for denying warrant- or execution-related 
claims. While these potential solutions may seem intuitive, courts have not 
adopted either. This Part canvasses the advantages and disadvantages of each 
of these solutions and explains why courts may have steered away from them.  
 
A. Allow Defendants to Raise Execution-Related Claims Sooner 
  
When thinking of this issue, the first logical solution seems to be to 
allow defendants to raise execution- and warrant-related claims sooner. The 
rationale: Death row defendants are, by definition, subject to execution. Thus, 
we should allow them to raise warrant- and execution-related claims so long 
as they are under a sentence of death. 
 The advantages of this approach include allowing defendants the 
opportunity to fully litigate their claims and the courts to fully review these 
claims without the time-pressure that often accompanies active warrants. In 
addition to allowing for more thorough investigation of these claims—for 
example, into new execution protocols—this solution seems to provide a sounder 
resolution of defendants’ claims, at least from a due process perspective.108 
 However, adopting this logic would require courts to abandon the 
longstanding theory that warrant- and execution-related claims are not ripe 
until the defendant is under an active warrant that provides a scheduled date 
and time for the defendant’s execution. Also, this approach could overwhelm 
courts with speculative claims. For instance, if a defendant challenges the 
state’s execution protocol as it stands in June 2019, the defendant assumes 
that protocol is the one that will exist (and be used) when the defendant is 
ultimately executed. Rather, the state could amend the protocol before the 
defendant’s execution, rendering any decision regarding the June 2019 
execution an exercise in futility—at least as applied to that specific defendant. 
 
107 See also Levit, supra note 34, at 85–86 (explaining how courts play into the opportunity 
to truncate postconviction review). 
108 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 538 (1985) (discussing the due process requirement of a “hearing at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). 
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 Further, this approach may not completely resolve the chilling effect 
on some warrant- and execution-related claims. For example, suppose a rule 
was implemented requiring defendants to raise warrant- and execution-
related claims in their first successive postconviction motions—the only 
guaranteed postconviction motion (and, therefore, appeal). What if a 
defendant does so, the appeal is denied, but the state proceeds to amend its 
execution protocol after that appeal is denied? Like the dilemma defendants 
currently face, as described above, the defendant would remain hard-pressed 
to find the appropriate opportunity for challenging the amended protocol 
since the first postconviction motion would have already been exhausted. 
Courts would likely say the defendant raised the claim too late—after the 
designated appeal. For these reasons, this approach is likely not the best 
solution to the procedural trap facing capital defendants in raising warrant- 
and execution-related claims. 
 
B. Disallow Courts from Using Delay as a Reason for Denying Execution-
Related Claims 
 
 The other seemingly obvious solution would be to disavow delay as 
a reason for denying warrant- or execution-related claims. Disallowing courts 
from denying warrant- or execution-related claims based on alleged delay in 
raising the claims would force courts to review the merits of these oftentimes 
significant claims. 
 However, this solution could result in unintended consequences that 
ultimately render this solution more detrimental to defendants than the 
problem it aims to resolve. For example, courts may be inclined to deny 
otherwise meritorious claims to avoid a stay of execution. Or, this solution 
could frustrate judges by causing the perception of too many unnecessary 
stays of execution, forced by the requirement that courts, faced with short 
warrant periods, review the merits of each claim.  
 Further, this solution would likely prove difficult to implement. A 
legislative mechanism would likely raise separation of powers issues because 
the legislative branch cannot tell the courts how to review, much less to rule 
on, cases or controversies.109 Likewise, a judicial mechanism, such as a 
Supreme Court determination that delay is an invalid reason for denying these 
claims, would be unlikely to rectify the issue. Even after such a 
 
109 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1950–51 (2015) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (warning of the danger of congressional violations of Article III 
judicial powers); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (describing the separation 
of powers into three distinct branches in the United States constitutional scheme); United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–04 (1974) (affirming that, despite “the deference each branch 
must accord the others,” the branches of government still retain separation of powers). 
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determination, the Supreme Court, in its final review of petitions for a writ 
certiorari or applications for a stay of execution, could still deny the claims 
and allow executions to proceed, as in Price’s case. Likewise, unless 
implemented by the Supreme Court, the state courts would likely determine 
their own iterations of the appropriate standard, causing a great lack of 
uniformity and, in turn, creating separate Eighth Amendment concerns.110 For 
these reasons, this is likely not the ideal solution to the procedural trap facing 
capital defendants in raising warrant- and execution-related claims. 
 
IV. ENACT AND ENFORCE UNIFORM WARRANT AND  
EXECUTION-RELATED PROCEDURES 
  
Having established that the seemingly obvious solutions are likely 
not ideal, this Part outlines a third, not-so-clear solution that, this Part 
contends, is the best route to balancing all of the competing interests and 
providing uniformity and stability to the capital appellate process with 
respect to warrant- and execution-related claims. Specifically, this Part 
contends the solution lies in enacting and enforcing uniform warrant 
procedures, whether by statute or rule. At the outset, Section A explains 
how some states have attempted to implement these types of procedures. 
Then, using those examples to guide the rest of the discussion, this Part 
presents a two-step solution in which states enact and enforce uniform 
warrant- and execution-related procedures. 
 Section B explains the first step in implementing this solution: the 
enactment of such warrant procedures—either by way of the legislature 
enacting a statute, or courts enacting a procedural rule.111 This Section 
defines the multiple aspects that a statute or rule should include and then 
provides proposed language. Once the necessary statutes or rues exist, the 
second step, which is discussed in Section C, would be for courts to be 
diligent in holding the other branches accountable by enforcing the 
statutes or rules. After explaining this two-step path to implementing this 
solution, Section D addresses potential counterarguments to this solution. 
Ultimately, this Part concludes that this solution is likely the best way to 
balance all of the competing interests involved here—judicial efficiency, 
defendants’ rights, etc.  
 
110 See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (detailing the different standards 
states have applied with regard to the Eight Amendment). 
111 Which of these would be appropriate would depend on each state’s governing law 
regarding the court’s jurisdiction to control procedure. 
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A. Prior Attempts to Institute Uniform Warrant Procedures 
 
 In response to the length of time the capital appellate process often 
takes—causing delays between sentencing and execution—some states have 
adopted procedures for expediting the post-trial process.112 Many of these 
state statutes are modeled after the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA), which “replaces all common law remedies, and provides one 
procedure for asserting every constitutional, jurisdictional, or other ground 
for collateral relief that has not been previously litigated or waived.”113 The 
UPCPA allows claims “to be brought at any time during imprisonment,” 
with certain limitations.114 
 For example, since 1984, Idaho has used “an expedited and 
consolidated appeal process,”115 the purpose of which was to “eliminat[e] 
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.”116 The Idaho 
statute requires defendants to “file any legal or factual challenge” to their 
sentence of death within forty-two days of judgment.117 Otherwise, the claim 
is waived.118 In other words, defendants have only “one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the[ir] conviction and sentence.”119 After the forty-two days 
passed or the one appeal was denied, a death warrant should be issued.120 
However, as a 2000 article explained, courts failed to consistently or 
regularly impose these restrictions.121 
 More drastic than Idaho, in 1989, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
“abolished its postconviction remedy altogether.”122 The court said it was 
concerned that postconviction was unnecessarily drawn out before cases were 
 
112 Fisher, supra note 20, at 87 (describing Idaho’s unitary system of reviewing appeals in 
capital cases). For other examples not discussed here, see generally John H. Blume, An 
Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice and Procedure in South Carolina, 45 
S.C. L. REV. 235 (1994) (reviewing South Carolina’s postconviction review process); 
Millemann, supra note 18 (reviewing Maryland’s postconviction review process); Jeffrey T. 
Renz, Post-Conviction Relief in Montana, 55 MONT. L. REV. 331 (1994) (reviewing 
Montana’s postconviction review process); Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies, 61 
COLUM. L. REV. 681 (1961) (discussing several states’ approaches to postconviction review). 
113 State Post-Conviction Remedies, supra note 112, at 698. 
114 Id. 
115 Fisher, supra note 20, at 87. 
116 Id. at 91 (citation omitted). 
117 IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(3) (2020); see Fisher, supra note 20, at 91. 
118 IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(5); see Fisher, supra note 20, at 91. 
119 Id. (quoting Paz v. State, 852 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Idaho 1993)). 
120 Id. at 102; see IDAHO CODE § 19-2719. 
121 Fisher, supra note 20, at 91. 
122 Id. at 108. 
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concluded.123 However, a year later, the court “reestablished [the] 
postconviction process.”124 
 In 2000, Florida Governor Jeb Bush called for the state “to adopt a 
‘unitary review’ system of appeal in capital cases, which is designed to 
shorten the time between conviction and execution of sentences.”125 Thirteen 
years later, the Florida legislature enacted the “Timely Justice Act of 2013” 
(“the Act”).126 The purpose of the Act was to “ensure that cases are processed 
in a timely manner.”127 Under the Act, the Governor of Florida is required to 
issue a warrant for execution within thirty days of the conclusion of the 
defendant’s guaranteed appeals, provided “the executive clemency process 
has concluded,”128 and the warrant should schedule the execution within 180 
days.129 However, similar to Idaho, Florida courts have not enforced the Act, 
and the warrant process in Florida remains a matter of complete executive 
discretion.130 In exercising this discretion, Florida’s governors have not upheld 
the statutory time periods. Most significantly, rather than heeding the 180-day 
warrant period provided for in the Act, Florida’s governors have recently 
 
123 Id. at 109–10. 
124 Id. at 109. 
125 Id. at 85. A “unitary review” system “essentially consolidates the direct appeal and state 
postconviction process to eliminate the additional time involved in” considering 
postconviction claims. Id. at 85–86. 
126 FLA. STAT. § 922.052 (2018). 
127 Bagdasarova, supra note 43; see Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 537 (Fla. 2014) 
(discussing the Act’s purpose to resolve capital cases as quickly as possible after the 
imposition of a death sentence). 
128 FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b) (2018); accord Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 543 (upholding this 
provision of the Act because it does not “unconstitutionally infringe[] on the Governor’s . . . 
unfettered discretion to issue warrants by mandating that the Governor must sign a warrant 
once the Clerk issues a certification”). 
129 FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b); see Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 543–44 (finding the 180-day 
requirement reasonable). 
130 In Abdool, the Supreme Court of Florida denied a constitutional challenge to the Timely 
Justice Act of 2013. 141 So. 3d at 538–47. In doing so, the court stated: “The State has a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that capital sentences are carried out in a timely manner.” Id. 
at 546. Florida defendants continue to unsuccessfully challenge this discretionary process. 
See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 509 (Fla. 2017) (“We have repeatedly and 
consistently denied these claims.” (citing Bolin v. State, 184 So. 3d 492, 502–03 (Fla. 2015)); 
Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162–63 (Fla. 2013) (“Because Mann has not presented any 
reason for this Court to recede from its prior decisions, Mann’s claim is without merit and 
was properly denied.”); Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (“Because we 
have previously rejected similar claims, we find that the circuit court properly denied 
Ferguson’s present claim.”); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012) (“As recently as last 
year, we rejected claims that because of the Governor’s absolute discretion to sign death 
warrants, and thereby decide who lives and who dies, the death penalty structure of Florida 
violates the United States Constitution.”); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 551–52 (Fla. 2011) 
(declining to “‘second guess’ the application of the exclusive executive function of clemency”). 
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provided warrant periods of merely thirty days, give or take.131 And, Florida is 
not alone in the phenomena of short warrant periods; just recently, Georgia 
issued a warrant that provided a warrant period of a scant twelve days.132 
 These former attempts by states to streamline the postconviction 
process focused on the goals of efficiency and reducing delay in the warrant 
litigation process. But they were insufficient in recognizing the vulnerability 
of defendants’ rights during the process they addressed.133  
 An Oregon statute seems to attempt to address defendants’ ability to 
raise additional claims when execution is pending. The statute provides for 
an automatic stay of ninety days if certain events trigger the stay and a thirty-
day stay after the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari to provide 
the defendant an opportunity to notice the lower court of a forthcoming claim 
for postconviction relief.134 The statute also directs that an execution is stayed 
while a defendant’s claim for postconviction relief is pending.135 Certainly, 
the ninety-day stay provided in the Oregon statute is better than the thirty-
day warrant periods recently provided in Florida, for example. 
 Drawing on these examples, the next Section discusses the first step 
in the two-step solution presented herein. 
 
B. States to Enact Uniform Warrant and Execution-Related Procedures 
 
 First, in the interest of uniformity and transparency in the warrant and 
execution process, states should enact uniform warrant procedures that both 
the executive and judicial branches must follow (“the procedures”). The 
procedures should explain when the defendant is eligible for execution—i.e., 
what appeals must be concluded. The procedures should also outline when, 
after the point the defendant becomes eligible for execution, an inmate’s 
warrant should be issued. As to the warrant, the procedures should enumerate 
what must be included in the death warrant—for example, the execution 
period and the scheduled date and time of the execution. 
 Then, the procedures should determine the warrant period—how long 
between the warrant being issued and the scheduled execution date. Likewise, 
 
131 See Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 493 (Fla. 2018) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (explaining 
how warrant periods, since executions resumed in Florida after Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. 
Ct. 616 (2016), have been too short to allow the courts sufficient time to review 
defendants’ claims); see also Kalmanson, supra note 49, 630-34 (discussing the effect of 
delay in the warrant and execution process). 
132 See Outcomes of Death Warrants in 2020, supra note 7. 
133 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 20, at 87; Levit, supra note 34, at 56 (expressing procedural 
due process concerns when postconviction review is expedited). 
134 OR. REV. STAT. § 138.686(3) (2020). 
135 Id. § 138.686(4). 
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the procedures should indicate that the defendant is entitled to one post-
warrant, pre-execution postconviction motion (and appeal), which shall be 
final before the execution process begins. Thus, the time period defined in 
the procedures between the warrant and the scheduled execution should be 
long enough to allow the judiciary to thoroughly and adequately review the 
defendant’s warrant- and execution-related claims without unnecessary rush. 
 As to the execution, the procedures should require the State to provide 
adequate notice to an inmate whose execution is pending if the State changes 
its lethal injection. Finally, the procedures should provide for what should 
occur if, for some reason (including delay caused by last-minute appeals), the 
execution does not occur at the date and time stated in the warrant.136 
 The proposed language below includes all of these aspects: 
 
Uniform Warrant- and Execution-Related Procedures. 
(1) The clerk of the [state’s highest court] shall 
inform the Governor in writing certifying when a person 
convicted and sentenced to death (“the Inmate”) has: 
(a) Completed direct appeal and initial 
postconviction proceedings in state court and habeas corpus 
proceedings and appeal therefrom in federal court, and the 
Inmate does not have any pending litigation related to his 
conviction or sentence; or 
(b) Allowed the time permitted for filing a habeas 
corpus petition in federal court to expire. 
(2) Within 30 days after receiving the letter of 
certification from the clerk of the [state’s highest court], the 
[Governor or appropriate actor] shall issue a warrant for 
execution if the executive clemency process has concluded 
and no cases remain pending, directing the warden to execute 
the Inmate’s sentence 180 days from the date of the warrant 
(“the Warrant Period”), at a time designated in the warrant. 
(a) Within twenty-four hours of the Governor 
issuing the warrant, the [appropriate state department] shall 
provide the Inmate and/or the Inmate’s attorney of record a 
copy of the execution protocol that the State intends to use for 
the execution. 
(b) If the State’s execution protocol changes 
during the Warrant Period, the updated protocol shall be 
provided to the Inmate and/or the Inmate’s attorney 
 
136 See Kalmanson, supra note 49, 630-34 (explaining how these indefinite execution delays 
likely create an Eighth Amendment violation). 
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immediately. If the State adopts a new protocol within fifteen 
days of the execution, the execution shall be rescheduled to 
allow sufficient time for the Inmate to review and, if 
necessary, challenge the amended protocol. 
(c) Within the Warrant Period provided in 
paragraph (2), the defendant shall be entitled to complete a 
final postconviction proceeding in state court and, if 
necessary, a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court 
regarding any warrant- or execution-related claims. The State 
shall not execute the Inmate until all pending cases related to 
the sentence for which the State intends to execute the Inmate 
are completed. 
(3) The State shall not execute the Inmate’s 
sentence until the Governor issues a warrant, attaches it to the 
copy of the record, and transmits it to the warden, directing 
the warden to execute the sentence at a date and time 
designated in the warrant.  
(4) If, for any reason, the Inmate’s sentence is not 
executed within thirty minutes of the time designated in the 
warrant, the execution shall be automatically and immediately 
stayed for a period of at least three (3) days.  
(a) If the stay is a result of delay, the Governor 
shall issue a new warrant rescheduling the execution, 
providing the Inmate with at least twenty-four hours notice. 
(b) Notwithstanding the three-day period provided 
in subparagraph (4), any court may provide for a longer stay 
period. If a court issues an indefinite stay, the warrant shall 
expire. When the stay is lifted, this process shall restart from 
the beginning. 
(5) If, for any reason, a court determines that a stay is 
necessary, it shall enter a stay of reasonable time to resolve 
the problem causing the stay. 
 
First, paragraph (1) explains when the State may execute an inmate’s 
sentence—after the inmate’s guaranteed appeals are complete. This paragraph 
also requires certification by the judiciary that the inmate has reached this point, 
providing a balance of power between the executive and judicial branches.  
Further, paragraph (1)(a) requires that all litigation from the 
defendant’s guaranteed appeals be complete before the warrant issues. This 
would significantly change and improve the backlog of pending petitions 
with which the Supreme Court is often faced on the night of execution. 
Oftentimes, a defendant goes into execution with a petition for writ of 
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certiorari pending at the Supreme Court from a prior appeal.137 Thus, the 
Supreme Court is reviewing not just the warrant-related petition, but several 
pending petitions with an execution looming. Paragraph (1)(a) would curb 
this issue by requiring that all of the defendant’s pending litigation related to 
the sentence and conviction be complete before the warrant is issued.  
Paragraph (2) provides a concrete timeline for all actors involved in 
the warrant process—defining when the warrant will be issued, the time for 
litigating any post-warrant claims, and when the execution should be 
scheduled. Paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(b) serve to streamline litigation 
regarding the execution protocol that will be used in the execution. By 
requiring the state to provide the defense with the protocol that will be used 
in the inmate’s execution, these provisions eliminate the need for litigation 
regarding access to the protocol.  
Further, paragraph (2)(c) guarantees each defendant the ability to 
raise any post-warrant and execution-related claims once the warrant is 
issued. Consistent with the way these claims are currently litigated, these 
claims would be brought via a postconviction motion in state court and, if 
necessary, a federal habeas proceeding.  
Under the statute, the final warrant-related case would be litigated in 
the 180-day warrant period, which provides state courts (and, ultimately, the 
Supreme Court) more time than they are often provided to review these 
claims. This longer time period should provide sufficient time for the trial 
court to hold an evidentiary hearing and/or for the appellate court to hold an 
oral argument, if necessary. If not, the procedures provide that the defendant 
is entitled to “complete” litigation of the final warrant-related claim; this 
provision should be read to include the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari. 
Additionally, under paragraph (5), courts would have grounds to stay the 
execution to complete review of the case. Therefore, the guarantee provided 
in paragraph (2)(c) curbs the due process concerns that coincide with 
shortened warrant periods and accelerated postconviction litigation, as 
scholars have articulated.138 Finally, the last sentence in paragraph (2)(c) 
makes clear that the execution shall not proceed if any litigation related to the 
sentence remains pending. 
Paragraph (3) provides a procedural checklist to ensure the execution 
does not proceed unless specific procedures have been followed. Finally, 
paragraph (4) removes the unknown from delayed and rescheduled 
executions, which has become prevalent with short warrant periods.  
 
137 See, e.g., Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 704 (Fla. 2017) (Pariente, J., dissenting) (arguing 
for a stay of execution until a pending petition for a writ of certiorari is resolved). 
138 See generally Fisher, supra note 20; Levit, supra note 34 (expressing procedural due 
process concerns when postconviction review is expedited). 
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Paragraph (4) indicates that the time of execution set in the warrant is 
a concrete time and shall be honored, within thirty minutes. Similarly, 
paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(b) explain what should occur if an execution is 
delayed past the time provided. This eliminates the current situation of 
defendants waiting—minute-by-minute, often for hours on end—to find out 
whether the scheduled execution will proceed, as in Bucklew’s case.139 And, 
if an execution must be rescheduled, the procedures provide guidelines for 
doing so—rectifying the current lack of guidance, as Bucklew and Price 
illustrate.140 In sum, these proposed procedures take the guesswork out of 
executions—for both the government and the inmate. 
 
C. Courts to Enforce Such Procedures 
 
 Enacting procedures like those outlined above is just the first step. 
States enacting procedures like those proposed above is insignificant if the 
procedures are not enforced, as illustrated by Idaho and Florida. Thus, the 
crucial second step to the solution proposed herein is for courts to enforce the 
procedures, once enacted. 
 For example, if the State amends its execution protocol within fifteen 
days of the scheduled execution, the court has the power under paragraph 
(2)(b) to stay the execution to allow for proper review and litigation over the 
new protocol, if necessary. Also, paragraph (4) gives the court the power to 
automatically enter a stay if the State does not begin the execution within 
thirty minutes of the scheduled execution time. Finally, paragraph (5) 
provides courts with oversight of the warrant process to ensure the 
defendants’ constitutional rights are protected, allowing courts to enter a stay 
for any reason the court deems proper. While courts technically have this 
ability now, the language in the proposed procedures expressly providing 
such power may incline courts to exercise it when feeling rushed in reviewing 
warrant- and execution-related claims. 
 
D. Addressing Counterarguments 
  
Some may argue that this approach is more defendant-adverse than 
the procedural problem it seeks to rectify—forcing executions, shortening the 
time between sentencing and execution, and, thereby, increasing the risk of 
executing innocent defendants. As with most issues related to capital 
sentencing, this issue presents a discord between interested actors that is 
 
139 See supra Part III. 
140 Id. 
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difficult to reconcile. Each of the potential counterarguments to the solution 
proposed above is addressed, in turn, below.  
 At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this Article does not 
address or otherwise consider abolition as a potential solution but, rather, 
addresses the current system, in which death is a viable punishment in 
numerous states. Without addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty 
itself, this Article aims to improve the protection of defendants’ rights in a 
system that accepts capital punishment. 
 First, some may counter this solution because it forces executions.141 
The short response is: yes, but that is what the current system demands, if it 
functions effectively. As stated at the outset, the purpose of this Article is not 
to abolish capital sentencing but, rather, to preserve capital defendants’ 
constitutional rights so long as we have capital sentencing in the United 
States. Relatively speaking, executions are rare in our current system because 
of the extreme delays and discretion in issuing death warrants.142 Defendants 
spend an inordinate amount of time on death row awaiting execution; most 
times, defendants will suffer a natural death before reaching execution.143 
This solution would likely cause an increase in the number of executions, and 
it would likely cause those executions to happen faster, by requiring states to 
schedule an inmate’s execution once the inmate completes the guaranteed 
appeals—as outlined in paragraph (1) of the statute.  
 As to the merits, by facilitating a thorough review of defendants’ 
warrant- and execution-related claims, this solution, at the least, guarantees 
that each defendant’s constitutional claims are properly reviewed before the  
execution. As a result, some defendants may properly avoid execution 
because the courts will find that their warrant- or execution-related claims, as 
guaranteed by the procedures, are meritorious. 
 As to timing, there are competing arguments. Some—most famously, 
Justice Breyer—would argue that shortening the time-frame between 
sentencing and execution serves to lessen the “cruel and unusual” nature of 
 
141 See, e.g., Florida’s Timely Justice Act to Speed Up Executions Becomes Law, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT (June 17, 2013), https://www.innocenceproject.org/floridas-timely-justice-act-to-speed- 
up-executions-becomes-law/ [https://perma.cc/7XUT-9LHM] (highlighting that innocent 
death row inmates may now be executed too quickly to achieve exoneration). 
142 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 16, at 13 (“Only a small fraction of the over 8000 death 
sentences imposed since the 1970s have resulted in executions . . . ”); STEIKER & STEIKER, 
supra note 9, at 2 (finding only 16 percent of death row inmates have been executed 
nationwide); Coleman, supra note 59, at 20–21 (generally finding an annual decline in the 
number of executions carried out year-to-year). 
143 STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 9, at 2. 
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the death penalty as it currently exists in the United States.144 Indeed, 
defendants often challenge their sentences and/or executions under the Eighth 
Amendment, arguing that the time they have waited on death row between 
sentencing and execution amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.145 Others 
may argue that it is better for a defendant to spend years awaiting execution 
and, instead, die naturally than to proceed sooner to execution.  
 As long as the death penalty exists and a defendant stands sentenced 
to death, case law directs that the state and victims have an interest in 
executions occurring.146 To that extent, this solution serves those interests 
while maintaining defendants’ right to due process in litigating their final 
claims. This shortened time period may incentivize courts to review 
defendants’ guaranteed appeals even more closely by avoiding fatigue in 
reviewing the same defendants’ numerous claims. Thus, shortening the delay 
between sentencing and execution actually serves the goal of ensuring 
constitutionality throughout the capital punishment process.  
 Notwithstanding, if a state found that the procedures unnecessarily 
forced warrants and therefore executions, it could enact an amended version 
of the procedures in which paragraph (2) provides:  
After receiving the letter of certification from the clerk of the 
[state’s highest court], the [Governor or appropriate actor] may 
issue a warrant for execution if the executive clemency process 
has concluded and no cases remain pending. When the warrant 
is issued, it shall direct the warden to execute the Inmate’s 
sentence 180 days from the date of the warrant (“the Warrant 
Period”), at a time designated in the warrant. 
This amended version would make the state’s issuing the warrant 
permissive rather than mandatory but still provide the defendant the same 
protections once the warrant is issued. 
 Next, some may argue that shortening the time between sentencing 
and execution lessens the time for the appellate process to work—especially 
 
144 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(considering excessive delays to be “cruel”); id. at 2748–49 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(discussing Breyer’s dissent on delay and explaining the length of time defendants spend on 
death row awaiting execution). 
145 See, e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 946 (Fla. 2019) (basing Eight Amendment claim, 
in part, on the length of time—more than thirty years—the defendant had spent on death 
row); Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 988 (Fla. 2018) (basing Eight Amendment claim, in 
part, on the length of time—twenty-four years—the defendant had spent on death row). 
146 See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1133 (2019) (“Both the State and the 
victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” (quoting 
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006))). 
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as it relates to claims of innocence.147 It often takes years for a wrongly 
convicted defendant to prove his or her innocence as a result of technological 
advances.148 The concern of executing wrongly convicted inmates is of 
utmost importance.149 Despite even the staggering amount of exonerations 
that have occurred since 1973, it is likely that they are “only the tip of the 
iceberg,” as Michael L. Radelet explains.150 However, the systemic issue of 
executing innocent persons and their innocence not being detected until 
years, if not decades, later is not fixed or eliminated by leaving defendants on 
death row for years awaiting execution, which could be scheduled at any time 
without warning.  
  In summary, this solution provides defendants with more notice and 
process in the post-warrant, pre-execution process, thereby reducing the 
overall risk of constitutional violations in each execution.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
Ultimately, it is the courts’ responsibility to ensure the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, which includes safeguarding 
defendants’ rights throughout the appellate process.151 While the period of 
time between the state issuing a warrant for an inmate’s execution and the 
actual execution is one of the most significant in a capital defendant’s life, it 
is one of the most overlooked insofar as protecting defendants’ rights. During 
 
147 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 59, at 21 (finding more individuals being removed from 
death row due to errors in their convictions); Florida’s Timely Justice Act to Speed Up 
Executions Becomes Law, supra note 141. 
148 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 16, at 35–36 (describing how exonerations based on new 
evidence do not occur quickly). 
149 See id. at 43 (“[T]here is about a 4 percent rate of exoneration in death penalty cases.”). 
The prevalence of wrongful convictions is a leading reason for abolition. Lyn Suzanne 
Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty 
Regime in the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 833–34 (2012). 
150 Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty 
Debates, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 204 (2008); see also GARRETT, supra note 16, at 43 (“We 
know that there is a ‘uniquely high rate of exoneration’ in death penalty cases”); Levit, supra 
note 34, at 64 (“[T]he capital punishment system . . . survives despite overwhelming evidence 
that a significant number of people who were factually innocent have been . . . put to death.”). 
151 As Justice Brennan stated in his Gregg dissent: 
This Court inescapably has the duty . . . to say whether . . . “moral concepts” 
require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should 
declare that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the 
screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society. 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the meaning of the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause not as static, but as evolving with the “standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). 
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that time, defendants often raise claims that could significantly affect the 
constitutionality of their ultimate execution. For example, defendants raise 
claims challenging the constitutionality of the state’s process for signing 
warrants, claims challenging the state’s execution protocol, etc. 
 As this Article explained, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in 
Bucklew v. Precythe and Price v. Dunn illustrate the procedural hardship 
capital defendants face across the country in raising these warrant- and 
execution-related claims. Through decades of jurisprudence, courts have 
effectively precluded defendants from meaningfully raising these claims. The 
correct time for defendants to raise warrant- and execution-related claims is 
some mysterious point between death row and death watch. While raising a 
claim before the defendant is under an active death warrant is too early, 
raising a claim while under a death warrant just before execution is too late. 
These claims fall into a black hole of procedural technicalities, likely 
subjecting defendants to unconstitutional executions. 
 In addition, ever-shortening warrant periods force courts to review the 
claims defendants do raise in last-minute fire drills. This often forces the 
Supreme Court to review several last-minute petitions for certiorari, the 
denial of which is the last step before the defendant’s execution. This last-
minute rush has recently resulted in executions being delayed late into the 
night, which presents additional constitutional concerns.  
 Addressing this problem, this Article explained that the best way to 
manage all the competing interests involved in this discussion is for state 
legislatures to enact and courts to enforce uniform warrant procedures. In 
defining this solution, this Article proposed model language for states to 
adopt—whether as statute or rules—procedures that outline the warrant 
process and, without compromising the state’s interest in the timely execution 
of death sentences, safeguard defendants’ rights up until execution. For as long 
as the death penalty remains viable in the United States, states should act 
diligently to respect and protect each defendant’s rights until the time of death. 
 
